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A 股上市公司发生董事长和总经理变更的公司为样本，分析了 2007-2010 年间董
事长和总经理变更的现状、原因等统计数据。根据理论分析和已有的文献，本文


























Top management turnover can be regard as an effect incentive and constraint 
mechanism which designed by principal (shareholder) for agent (manager). These 
mechanism incentive managers to satisfy shareholders’ benefit, and it also severely 
punished when managers’ action was harmful to shareholders. Top management 
turnover is one of the most important decisions in corporate government in modern 
firms, that acted by internal and external corporate governance mechanism. The 
decision of top management turnover is the result of competition to stakeholder. 
Based on principal-agent theory and corporate government theory, this paper 
analyzes relation of top management turnover and corporate government. Top 
management turnover is classified as routine turnover and nonroutine turnover. Then, 
use Logistic Regression Model to analyze impacts of corporate performance on 
management turnover for CEO and the chairman in a sample of A-share companies 
listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2007 through 2010.  
The result shows that the possibility of the nonrountine top management turnover 
increased when the company has an inferior corporate performance. By analysis of 
regression, the probability of top management turnover is significant positively 
correlated with ownership concentration, the proportion of independent directors and 
the board meeting frequency. There is no significant correlation between the 
probability of top management turnover and the size of board. The negative 
correlation between the leadership structure (when CEO and the chairman of board 
are combined), managerial ownership and the top management turnover is not marked. 
According to empirical results, this paper proposes several suggestions.  
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Dahya 等（2002）6研究了英国公司自 1992 年以来（1992 年，英国颁布法
规规定公司的 CEO 和董事长不能兼任）高管更换与企业经营业绩之间的关系，
发现 CEO 更换与公司经营业绩之间有显著的负相关关系，1992 年之后的高管
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